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ABSTRACT: As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remark-
able development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon dif-
ferent aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might 
be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in 
the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commen-
tators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical 
corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this 
view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding 
on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists 
of direct reference.
Keywords: Kant; theory of natural kind terms; direct reference theory; indexicality; Leibniz; Kripke; Putnam.
RESUMEN: Como es bien sabido, la reflexión lingüístico-filosófica sobre los términos de género natural experimentó un 
notable desarrollo a principios de los setenta con las aproximaciones esencialistas de Kripke y Putnam, que toca-
ban distintos aspectos (metafísicos y epistemológicos en particular) de orientación kantiana. Preliminarmente, 
sin embargo, puede ser útil revisar algunas de las etapas teóricas en las aproximaciones de Locke y Leibniz a los 
términos de género natural a la luz de las reflexiones contemporáneas, para finalmente determinar la contribu-
ción de Kant y observar cómo algunos comentaristas le han situado dentro de la teoría de la referencia directa. 
Comenzando con pruebas textuales que incluyen incluso el corpus lógico, en este ensayo me propongo discu-
tir algunos de los argumentos que desestiman la adhesión de Kant a esa concepción. Estos argumentos asumen 
que, en su acercamiento a la semántica de los términos de género natural, Kant parece sujetarse aún a una posi-
ción nominalista-conceptualista, aunque parece ser plenamente consciente de algunas cuestiones centrales para 
los teóricos de la referencia directa.
Palabras clave: Kant; teoría de los géneros naturales; indexicalidad; Leibniz; Kripke; Putnam.
1. Preliminaries
As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has under-
gone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essential-
ist approaches (cf. §3), touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological 
in particular) of Kant’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of 
the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light 
of contemporary reflections (cf. §2), to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see 
* I would like to give particular thanks to Mirella Capozzi and Pasquale Frascolla for their valuable sug-
gestions.
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how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference (cf. §4). Start-
ing with textual evidence even from the logical corpus (cf. §§5-6), in the present essay I will 
attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this view. These 
assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still 
holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a 
few key issues for the theorists of direct reference (§§7-8).
2. Locke and Leibniz on natural kind terms
In some passages from the third book of the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, 
Leibniz attacks Locke’s position on natural kind terms, reconsidering the role of the epis-
temic component (the ‘provisional definition’, i.e. Locke’s ‘nominal essence’). In particular, 
in doing so he shifts the theoretical weight onto our need to contemplate the substances’ 
real essence and internal constitution to explain how terms may relate to those substances 
making up the metaphysical furnishing of reality.
According to some of Leibniz’s commentators —among which Jolley, Kulstad and 
Goodin— this specific standpoint connects Leibniz with Putnam’s The Meaning of ‘Mean-
ing’ and his own semantic conception. As is known, this lies in the wake of Putnam’s first 
realism on both the metaphysical plane, for his need to contemplate an essentialist base of 
substances, and the epistemic plane, to postulate the social character of the division of lin-
guistic work which lays down the definitions and the semantic properties of a term within 
a given linguistic community.
Leibniz argues that the terms of the substances surrounding us in nature tend asymp-
totically to capture some features of the substances’ very essence. As a consequence, sub-
stances are held to play a primary role in the method and significance of scientific classi-
fication and human knowledge more in general, whether this succeeds in consigning the 
properties of the substances or not, to eventually rely on a provisional and perfectible defi-
nition.
This is indeed the very point of contrast with Locke’s thesis in his An Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding. The empiricist philosopher applied a clear division between 
real and nominal essence, between the metaphysical order and the order involved in the 
processing of the definitions labelled by a linguistic term: it is not possible to classify nor 
name substances on the basis of their real essence since this is precluded to our own facul-
ties from an epistemic point of view (1690, III, VI, 9).
Locke does not deny the ontological existence of the substance nor its particular in-
ner constitution, which, according to the corpuscular theory espoused by the philoso-
pher, founds all its qualities. The point (and the epistemological caesura) is that since 
the inner corpuscular structure is not accessible, we cannot distinguish the aspects of 
the substance’s actual constitution on which depend its essential qualities, nor, as a con-
sequence, the definitions and respective demarcations between one substance and an-
other. Locke’s opportunistic mind (cf. Formigari 2001, 159), based on an inherently 
constructivistic as well as representational paradigm, sets up a constitutive relation-
ship between language and thought, and furthermore is responsible alone for the scien-
tific (and non-scientific) division of natural substances and the proper use of words: a 
term designates nothing but an abstract mental representation, i.e. the nominal essence, 
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which consists of the single representations selected on the grounds of human inter-
ests and needs that identify and separate essential from accidental qualities to define the 
substance in question.
The demarcations and similarities between substances underlying their respective clas-
sifications —hence, the identification of the essential qualities enabling us to establish the 
boundaries between one substance and another— are not based on the order of the real but 
rather are produced by the human intellect. In its turn, the human intellect’s main activity 
consists in abstracting and combining multiple, rhapsodic, sporadic sensations originated 
in the perceptual domain. Subsequently, these will be turned into simple, complex ideas, 
which, in their turn, will receive a name by means of a voluntary imposition. Hence, not 
only the sharing of cognitive contents within a given community but also the formation 
of knowledge itself implies the association of linguistic terms with abstract ideas —under-
stood as marks of ideas, namely subjective signs of memory and intersubjective tools of com-
munication— enabling us to bestow stability and continuity upon the arbitrary character 
of the abstractive scheme.
The mental order mediates between words and substances: the list of properties form-
ing an idea —i.e. the nominal essence, the set of similarities which the human spirit selects 
among all potentially available similarities in the corpuscular structure— results from the 
historical contingent order in which men operate. At the same time, not only does the lin-
guistic order preserve the product of this cognitive segmentation, it also articulates thought 
at an individual level so as to make it possible, enabling us to share intersubjective knowl-
edge. The separation between mental (and linguistic) order on the one hand, and real order 
on the other —along with the primacy of the former over the latter— lies on the epistemo-
logical rather than ontological plane: although real essences are the causes of the existence 
of the substances’ properties, as it were, the boundaries between the substances composing 
the natural classifications are posed by nominal essences, by the contingent choices made 
by men.
Locke —not only in contrast with Leibniz but also with Putnam— holds that a speci-
men must belong to a given species on the condition that it possesses all the properties 
contained in its respective nominal essence. Therefore, the presence of such nominalist 
criteria will enable us to determine unquestionably whether, for example, a substance is 
gold or not. In addition, seeing that a word is associated with a mental and abstract repre-
sentation, with the nominal essence, so as to fix it and make it possible, it follows that it 
is always possible to determine the correct use of a natural substance term in naming per-
formances.
From this perspective, if nominal essence is entirely responsible for the division of sub-
stances in the natural world, epistemic access to real essence must inherently depend on 
nominal essence, that is on the mental order produced by men’s choices; this implies, for 
example, that the real essence of gold is wholly determined by its nominal essence. As dif-
ferent nominal essences will correspond to different corpuscular structure configurations, 
their real essence will no longer be the same (Kulstad, Goodin 2005, 218).
At first glance, Leibniz and his well-known interest in a nominalism purged of Hob-
bes’s alleged excesses concede Locke (and his position) a few arguments (cf. Mates 1986; 
Gensini 2000). If substances have an internal structure —namely a metaphysical basis 
from which spring all the qualities with which we enter in contact in the perceptual do-
main— most of the time there is no knowledge of such an inner structure. The frontiers 
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making up the classifications of natural substances are laid down by the mental construc-
tions of men, i.e. by the epistemically contingent cognitive formations of a particular 
historical moment: in the words of Leibniz (1765, III, VI, 13, 310), ‘[by] the attributes 
which appear to us the most convenient for distinguishing and comparing things and, in 
short, for recognizing species or sorts’. Such is the fundamental role Leibniz grants to the 
provisional definition, a notion which corresponds (although in some respects only) to 
Locke’s nominal essence:
Gold can be nominally defined in various ways - it can be called the heaviest body we have, 
the most malleable, a fusible body which resists cupellation and aquafortis, etc. Each of these 
marks is sound, and suffices for the recognition of gold: provisionally, at least […]. So one can say 
that in matters where we have only the empiric’s kind of knowledge our definitions are all merely 
provisional. (Leibniz 1765, III, IV, 16, 299-300)
Indeed, Leibniz reconsiders the role played by nominal essence and assigns the provisional 
definition a status of its own (cf. Goodin 1999): it is true that substances can be the objects 
of knowledge only through a mental construct —namely through empirical definitions, 
‘concepts’ emerging from time to time from the contingent choice of attributes— however, 
this construct is in itself the product of the joint intervention of perceptions, i.e. sensory 
stimuli grounded on reality, and the innate equipment of the intellect, also referred to as 
‘ideas’. In this sense, bodies, of which we have knowledge, are well-founded phenomena ul-
timately based on the austere ontology of monads.
According to Leibniz’s metaphysical vision, the objective order of reality and the sub-
jective order of knowledge ultimately converge in the principle of expressio. This is a point 
of balance between an essentialist basis —which cannot be ignored if we wish to categorize 
according to an analogy of ‘structure’ (habitudo)— and the contingent formation of hu-
man knowledge, which is nothing but the ‘expression’ of that metaphysical basis, albeit dif-
ferent in its own independent reprocessing.
The gap between Locke’s nominal essence and Leibniz’s provisional definition unfolds 
at various points (Kulstad, Goodin 2005, 218-9). Basically, while nominal essence is the 
sole responsible for the division among substances, provisional definition is not. Real es-
sence, Locke holds, is entirely determined —obviously from a strictly epistemological point 
of view— by nominal essence: there is no difference between the order of the real and the 
cognitive order, no real essence without nominal essence. Leibniz, on the contrary, regards 
provisional definitions as provisional indeed, and differences between definitions and real 
essences as possible at all times.
The arbitrary constructivism of Locke’s abstractive schema has free scope in the deter-
mination and classification of natural kinds exactly because the epistemic caesura with the 
metaphysical order is established once and for all. For Leibniz, on the contrary, (1) there 
exists a classification of substances totally founded in nature; (2) natural classification is 
constitutive and independent from that of men’s; (3) the cognitive order parallels the or-
der of the real, it is the ‘expression’ of the metaphysical structure of reality; (4) such an ap-
proximation occurs regardless whether the defining properties summarized by a term actu-
ally capture the essential qualities or not; (5) for the very reason that we can make mistakes 
in the contingent categorization of reality, the provisional definition is no longer the me-
diation core of the relationship between words and substances as in Locke’s system, where 
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nominal essence is regarded as the sole —and for this reason unfailingly reliable— criterion 
for the knowledge and cataloguing of natural substances.
This crucial point anticipates some elements of Putnam’s perspective. Leibniz main-
tains that the word ‘gold’ can be used to designate the relative substance even if this is un-
known and even if the nominal definition associated with the term and the real essence 
may diverge. Contrary to Locke, Leibniz contends that a particular specimen of metal may 
present all the properties making up gold’s nominal definition (malleable, fusible, etc.) even 
if that particular metal is not exactly gold, due to the presence of a different real essence. As 
is well known, this is the essentialist scenario contemplated by Putnam in his Gedankenex-
periment of the Twin Earth, devised to clarify his externalist perspective, as will be said. The 
priority Putnam grants to the so-called contribution of the environment in the determina-
tion of substance term reference is summarized, and anticipated, in a powerful passage in 
Leibniz (1765, III, III, 14, 292): ‘If men disagree in the name, does that change the things 
themselves or their resemblances?’.
3. Kripke and Putnam on the theory of direct reference
The scientific essentialism accounts for the philosophical framework wherein the theory of 
direct reference was articulated by Kripke and Putnam in the early seventies in several pa-
pers and essays1. I take Kripke’s doctrine as the paradigm of scientific essentialism2:
Scientific investigation generally discovers characteristics of gold which are far better than the 
original set. For example, it turns out that a material object is (pure) gold if and only if the only el-
ement contained therein is that with atomic number 79. Here the ‘if and only if’ can be taken to 
be strict (necessary). In general, science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find 
the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind. (Kripke 1982, 138)
Kripke and Putnam object Frege’s (and, mutatis mutandis, Locke’s) semantic descriptiv-
ist approach, for which the reference of natural kind terms, and that of proper names too, 
1 Cf. essays in Putnam (1975), particularly The Meaning of ‘Meaning’, and Kripke (1982). Needless to 
say, while a number of authors judge metaphysical essentialism to be a consequence of the theory of di-
rect reference, others consider the two positions as independent; Kripke and Putnam’s approaches to 
scientific essentialism, which will not be taken into account here, differ; Putnam has reworked funda-
mental metaphysical and epistemic aspects of his philosophical reflection.
2 Hanna (2006, 152-3): ‘Scientific essentialism is held to follow directly from: (1) A general thesis con-
cerning the correct analysis of necessary or strongly modal statements (namely, that they are logically 
or strictly metaphysically necessary and “Leibnizian”, or true in all logically possible worlds accessi-
ble from a designated world, our actual world). (2) A general theory of the semantics of natural kind 
terms (namely, that every natural kind term is a “rigid designator”: it holds its actual-world reference 
fixed across all possible worlds in which its referent exists, and never picks out anything else otherwise). 
(3) A specific thesis about the modality of identity-statements involving rigid designators (namely, that 
if they are true, then they are necessarily true). (4) A specific linguistic claim to the effect that natural 
kind terms are rigid designators, based on some proposals concerning the nature of the linguistic mech-
anisms of reference-fixing at work in society at large and in the natural sciences in particular (namely, 
the “causal theory of names”, and the socio-linguistic hypothesis of “linguistic division of labor”.)’.
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is determined on the grounds of a descriptive content since the individual/substance satis-
fies the properties expressed by the descriptive contents associated with the terms. In par-
ticular, Putnam states that a natural kind term can be used notwithstanding the fact that 
the descriptive content of the term may not be satisfied by the substance in question: if a 
speaker does not know the difference between an elm and a beech, and yet employs the cor-
responding terms, these will refer to two different trees even if the content ascribed to ‘elm’ 
and ‘beech’ is the same, making it thus impossible to distinguish them.
Similarly, in Putnam’s well-known ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment, in which he 
hypothesizes a planet identical to Earth in every other way except for water —whose mi-
cro-structure, different from H2O, is condensed by the formula XYZ— an earthling and 
his or her twin will refer to two different substances every time they use the term ‘water’, 
although the conceptual content or stereotype associated with the term is the same be-
cause both perceive the same macro-properties (a clear, odourless, tasteless liquid, etc.). 
It is not the content/meaning in the two speakers’ heads that determines the reference: 
natural kind terms, just like proper names, are directly referential, or have an indexical 
component, to use Putnam’s terminology. Reference is fixed by a baptism, an act of in-
tentional labelling that establishes a causal and punctual relationship between a single 
term and a substance, a relationship that stays unchanged in both name and substance on 
the assumption of the indexical component fixing the paradigm of the substance’s exten-
sion. The relationship between name and substance —the causal chains of transmission 
in a linguistic community— must be inherited socially; in other words, the intention to 
refer constantly to what possesses the same essential properties as the substance of the in-
itial baptism must stay unaltered so that the two most extreme rings of the chain can be 
assumed.
Once the introductory event is created by a baptism, it is nature, i.e. the metaphysical 
order, which determines (as Leibniz puts it) a term’s reference. However, Putnam main-
tains that the changeover fixing the reference will occur through an intentional device that 
introduces and establishes the chain between a name and a substance, its final ring being 
the indexical act ‘this’, conventionally set up and socially inherited. Leibniz, on the other 
hand, adopts quite different criteria for the introduction and determination of linguistic 
reference3.
3 Leibniz regards the environment’s primacy in an utterly different way by the law of expression. In a 
well-known letter to Arnauld, dated 9th October 1687, Leibniz comments that one thing expresses 
another provided that there exists a constant and regulated connection between what can be said 
of both. A little earlier, in Quid sit idea, Leibniz already distinguishes the more powerful similitudo 
from the analogia habitudinum, two characterizations of lex expressionis, for which, in the expression 
of a thing, there are structures (habitudines) that correspond to the structures of the thing to be ex-
pressed (cf. Gensini 2005, 60). Once this particular relation, postulated through a structural-based 
correspondence, is framed within the linguistic field, it cannot be assimilated to the indexical com-
ponent: the notion of expression is geometrical/mathematical, indicating a relationship between sign 
and reality which is justified according to a correspondence rule (which does not imply a naive no-
tion of iconicity or similarity). From a strictly linguistic point of view, this is specified by the state-
ment that words are made up of a psychological (affectus) and phonic (soni) complex ruled by the law 
of consensus: Leibniz’s analogy, namely that particular link connecting language with reality, lies be-
tween verba and res through the human affectus caused by things as well as the subsequent mediation 
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In this framework we can distinguish no less than three different theoretical dimen-
sions. In particular, the first dimension is metaphysical: natural kinds are identified by 
virtue of their essence or nature based on micro-properties or micro-structures analysed 
by science, on which depend those macro-properties that are the objects of empirical ob-
servation (of course, the philosophical debate on this dependency relationship offers sev-
eral metaphysical options with a crucial impact on the essentialist thesis). Secondly, an 
epistemic dimension: structures and micro-properties that make up the substances of 
natural kinds are investigated by science. The resulting knowledge is just as a posteriori as 
the knowledge of macroscopic properties, in their turn the objects of empirical observa-
tion; by contrast, knowledge of the macrophysical properties of natural kinds belongs to 
conceptual stereotypes of common sense and a priori knowledge is specified by the con-
ceptual or logical/linguistic analysis of the dictionary meanings of the terms that make 
up the natural kind stereotypes employed in a given society (Hanna 2006, 156). Lastly, 
we also distinguish a semantic dimension: natural kind terms are rigid designators, i.e. 
terms referring to the same referent in all possible worlds in which the referent exists, 
and are based on a mechanism of direct reference4. Their semantic content is not made 
of descriptions or conceptual contents as is identified by its referents, determined, in 
their turn, through a baptism that establishes a causal chain, socially inherited, between 
terms and substances.
If true, a statement of essential identity involving two co-referential rigid designators 
—e.g. one relative to the natural kind, the other relative to what are regarded as its micro-
properties, as in the statement ‘water is H2O’— expresses a necessary truth from a meta-
physical point of view which is valid in all possible worlds, however epistemically a poste-
riori. On the other hand, to retrieve an example from Kant (‘gold is a yellow metal’) that I 
will attempt to analyse in the next section, statements of identity involving a natural kind 
rigid designator and a term referring to one of the macro-properties of the substance in 
question express a truth which is metaphysically contingent and epistemically a posteriori: 
the substance’s macro-properties, such as gold’s yellow colour, do not express the essence of 
the natural kind and are used empirically to categorize substances from a linguistic/cogni-
tive point of view.
of the mimetic power of voice. Hence, Leibniz interprets the natural by the law of expression through 
a threefold process: affectus, expressing a state of things, and sound, expressing affectus. For this par-
ticular aspect of historic-natural languages, the intentional act of baptism plays no constitutive role in 
Leibniz’s system; suffice it to remember his outspoken criticism of the arbitraristic (and Aristotelic) 
conception —and, in particular, to the voluntas component— of the choice of men or collectivity; in 
short, Leibniz’s criticism of Locke’s voluntary imposition of names. This is an arbitrary device apply-
ing to rational languages in particular (such as characteristica universalis) and, more limitedly, to nat-
ural languages, as can be seen in a passage from Epistolaris dissertatio (1712), where the Platonic in-
stance is explicitly invoked whereas the possibility that names are hominum deliberatione constituta, à 
la Kripke, is limited.
4 Obviously, not all rigid designators are directly referential (for a presentation of the theory of direct 
reference, cfr. Kaplan, 1989). Needless to say, there has been much debate of whether and (if so) how 
natural kind terms are to be understood as rigid, and there is no consensus, cfr. Bird, Tobin (2012). 
Since the main aim of this paper is to verify the presence of a direct referential mechanism in the Kan-
tian approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, I will not consider these aspects of the debate.
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4. Kant and the a priori nature of the judgement ‘gold is a yellow metal’
On the basis of the identification of metaphysically necessary truths —albeit a posteriori, 
from an epistemic point of view— the essentialist approach overtly polemicizes with Kant. 
An example is found in Putnam (1975, 233):
Since Kant there has been a big split between philosophers who thought that all necessary 
truths are analytic and philosophers who thought that some necessary truths were synthetic a pri-
ori. But none of these philosophers thought that a (metaphysically) necessary truth could fail to 
be a priori: the Kantian tradition was as guilty as the empiricist tradition of equating metaphysi-
cal and epistemic necessity. In this sense Kripke’s challenge to received doctrine goes far beyond 
the usual empiricism/Kantianism oscillation.
Nevertheless, several commentators have attempted to articulate Kant’s arguments 
against an essentialistic perspective —cf. Kroon, Nola (1987), Anderson (1994), Hanna 
(1998) (2006)— in an effort to frame his semantic approach within the theory of direct 
reference. As I will try to argue, although a number of theoretical points connected to 
this framework can be certainly discovered, Kant’s approach to natural kind terms is still 
bound to a nominalist/conceptualist position spelled out according to the dictates of tran-
scendental idealism.
In the same manner as Locke, Kant articulates a sharp division between epistemic 
and metaphysical order. In agreement with the principles of transcendental idealism 
and the separation between noumena and phenomena, the ultimate nature of substances 
—i.e. their internal foundation— is utterly inaccessible from an epistemic point of view. 
On the one hand, the thesis of transcendental idealism is even more radical than Locke’s 
caesura: while Kant explicitly rejects Berkeley’s anti-realism owing to the noumena/phe-
nomena distinction, he agrees with the Irish bishop’s dismissal of any subdivision be-
tween primary and secondary qualities, as also supported by Locke, to eventually reject 
a representational paradigm based on resemblances even as regards primary qualities 
(1997, 289). On the other hand, within his transcendental idealism Kant defends his 
own version of empirical realism (KrV A370) —what Hanna (2006, 142) has relabelled 
‘manifest realism’— based on his adoption of the Newtonian principles of physics and 
subsequent refusal of the corpuscular theory adopted by Locke (KrV A265/B321). The 
metaphysically assumed existence of material reality conjugates with Newton’s princi-
ples, for whom reality amounts to a series of movements of material bodies containing 
perceptible properties and interacting with one another in compliance with the laws of 
physics in a macroscopic space-time dimension apprehended as a phenomenon. If, for 
Kant, empirical concepts relative to nature only apply to objects of possible experience 
(Log, 1992, 143-44), the foundation of natural substances cannot be object of knowledge 
for it lies outside the forms of possible experience established by transcendental investi-
gation. In a letter to Reinhold, dated May 1789, Kant (1967, 299-300) is particularly ex-
plicit on this matter:
The real essence (the nature) of any object, that is, the primary inner ground of all that nec-
essarily belongs to a given thing, this is impossible for human beings to discover. For example, ex-
tension and impenetrability are the whole logical essence of the concept of matter, that is, they are 
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all that is necessarily and primitively contained in my, and every man’s, concept of matter. But to 
recognize the real essence of matter, the primary, inner, sufficient ground of all that necessarily 
belongs to matter, this far exceeds the capacity of human powers. We cannot discover the [real] 
essence of water, of earth, or the [real] essence of any other empirical objects.
In this context we should include Kant’s famous statement (1997, 267) that ‘gold is a yel-
low metal’ is an analytic, a priori and necessary judgement:
All analytic judgments depend wholly on the principle of contradiction, and are in their na-
ture a priori cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. 
For the predicate of an affirmative analytic judgment is already thought in the concept of the sub-
ject, of which it cannot be denied without contradiction […] For this very reason all analytic judg-
ments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, ‘Gold is a yellow metal’; 
for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold, which had as its content that 
this body is yellow and metal. For just this constituted my concept; and I need only decompose it, 
without looking beyond it elsewhere.
Kripke (1980, 39) overtly rejects the analytical a priori character attributed to the judge-
ment. According to the above-mentioned dimensions making up the essentialist approach 
of the direct reference theory, and considering the term ‘gold’ as subject and, for brevity, 
only the term ‘yellow’ (whose reference is a phenomenal quality) as predicate, for a pure es-
sentialist perspective like Kripke’s, the statement cannot be but synthetic, contingent and a 
posteriori. Indeed, while ‘being yellow’ is a macro-property of the substance gold which de-
pends, to a certain extent, on one’s perceptual system, on the other hand it does not con-
cern its essence. As opposed to the dictates of the essentialist approach, Kant’s articulation 
of the epistemic dimension addresses those very macro-properties of the substances since 
there can only be knowledge of the possible objects of experience based on the principles of 
transcendental idealism, precluding any possibility to find out the inner nature of the sub-
stances themselves.
In order to understand the reasons having led Kant to state the a priori nature of the 
judgement ‘gold is a yellow metal’, it might be useful to recall the indissoluble link between 
thought and language and, more specifically, the characteristics of the empirical/concep-
tual and linguistic dimension. Accordingly, these come into play to determine the seman-
tics of the terms referring to the substances all around us in nature by means of the plexus 
that binds concept, logical essence and linguistic terms. However, this cannot be attained 
without specifying at once that it is possible —within a conceptualist frame— to identify 
two different dimensions in Kant’s semantic approach to natural kind terms, i.e. a logical/
formal dimension, as it were, and a material dimension5.
5 These cannot overlay the two components of the semantic device included in Anderson (1994), one 
‘stable’ and the other ‘unstable’, wherein Kant’s natural kind terms are quasi-indexical terms whose 
meaning and reference can be determined through a core-concept and, in a broad sense, a pragmatic di-
mension based on an indexical device. However, I will later return to this point in discussing Hanna’s 
(2006) somewhat similar proposal.
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5. The relation between term, concept, and natural substance
With the formal/logical dimension in mind as a starting point, every concept has a logical 
essence, namely a set of essential, necessary, immutable, and limited conceptual notes. As 
the concept is associated with a linguistic term expressing it, its nominal definition clears 
up the link between logical essence and term. These considerations must be comprised 
within the context of general logic and its difference with transcendental logic, that con-
siders the former as unconcerned with the content or matter of thought but only with the 
form of representations and the way they turn into concepts. The point is well summarized 
in the context of the KrV (A721/B749) that deals with the difference between mathemati-
cal and philosophical method starting from the well-known distinction between analytic 
and synthetic propositions:
I could analyze my empirical concept of gold without thereby gaining anything more than be-
ing able to enumerate what I actually think by means of this word, which would certainly produce 
a logical improvement in my cognition, but no augmentation or supplementation of it. But I can 
take the matter that goes by this name and initiate perceptions of it, which will provide me with 
various synthetic though empirical propositions.
Conceptual analysis cannot increase knowledge from a material point of view since it 
merely expounds the notes contained in logical essence, associated, in their turn, with the 
word-concept in question. It is precisely within the articulation of conceptual form that 
the statement ‘gold is a yellow metal’ (seen as an analytical judgement expressing a pri-
ori knowledge) should be contextualized. It is sufficient to apply a linguistic and concep-
tual analysis to the very bond linking word and concept to state that the conceptual note 
‘yellow’ must be contained in the concept of ‘gold’. Once the conceptual plot and its rela-
tive linguistic/conceptual links are established, they can be traced back a priori in order to 
find the notes that make up the logical essence of a concept; in other words, it is possible 
to identify the specific connection between the subject-concept and the concept-predicate 
contained in it that make up an analytic judgement.
Empirical concepts can only contain conceptual notes relative to macro-structural 
properties that are objects of possible experience. Therefore, if the concept ‘gold’ contains 
the conceptual note ‘yellow’ to form an analytic judgement, in a similar way —and regard-
less of the fact that, at Kant’s time, chemical knowledge was very limited— the concept of 
gold does not contain the conceptual note ‘element having atomic number 79’ analytically. 
Hence, Kant holds the judgement ‘gold is the element having atomic number 79’ to be syn-
thetic and known a posteriori (Anderson 1994, 357; Hanna 1998, 501).
If this is the conceptualist soul of Kant’s approach to the semantic theory of natural 
kind terms, a material dimension can be specified by investigating how conceptual plots are 
formed and used. One thing is the formal dimension of the conceptual nexus by means of 
which we can determine the analytical nature of judgements, another thing is the material 
dimension of transcendental logic, that can be referred to the concepts’ formation and appli-
cation to intuitions according to synthetic judgements, e.g. in denomination performances.
In the passage from the KrV (A721/B749) on the synthetic judgements concerning mat-
ter, we can trace an early mention to both the perceptual relationships that increase knowl-
edge and an unavoidably indexical link between term and matter. This indexical link is more 
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explicitly restated in the quoted passage from Prolegomena (1997, 267), for this reason Hanna 
(2006, 212) adds ‘[Kant] explicitly describes “my concept of gold, which had as its content 
that this body is yellow and metal”’ (italics added). Although I will later return to this specific 
point to mitigate some conclusions, now it is necessary to point out the interdependence be-
tween conceptual and intuitive dimension in reference determination, which depends not 
only on conceptualist criteria but also on the introduction of empirical intuition6.
As opposed to Leibniz’s framework, both the conceptualist and the Kripkian/Putnam-
ian essentialist perspectives operate a clear-cut distinction between metaphysical and epis-
temic order. Of course, this takes place from two different directions, i.e. in one case from 
the epistemic side of nominal essence, in the other from the essentialist side of the sub-
stance’s nature. The causal chain created by an introductory event binding name and sub-
stance remits the issue of linguistic reference to the essential nature of substances rather 
than to contingent nominalist criteria; hence, the reference between a term and the sub-
stance is ensured, be the latter epistemically captured or not.
Kant’s caesura concerns the epistemic side, implying the anti-Leibnizian objection to 
the fixing of a species infima or a complete notion of an individual or substance from a met-
aphysical point of view (KrV A655-6/B683-4). At the same time, Kant (Logik 1992, 595) 
acknowledges the determination of a lowest species by convention, ignoring the concep-
tual differences which —according to the regulative principle of reason given by the tran-
scendental law of specification (KrV A656/B684)— can be articulated within any concept 
at all times. Additionally, the contingent condition of uniqueness of the lowest species, in 
exactly the same way as the denotation of definite descriptions, requires an empirical intui-
tion: a substance is specifically identified by a concept so long as an intuition incompatible 
with those conceptual assumptions is given (Thompson 1972, 331). In other words, the in-
troduction of species infima or of criteria for the determination of a substance cannot pro-
vide identification conditions valid once and for all, its conventional and provisional nature 
always implying the possibility for further intuitions to disavow those criteria. The follow-
ing Kantian passage specifies this aspect by introducing new elements of reflection on the 
relationship between term, concept and natural substance:
in the concept of gold one person might think, besides its weight, color, and ductility, its property 
of not rusting, while another might know nothing about this. One makes use of certain marks 
only as long as they are sufficient for making distinctions; new observations, however, take some 
away and add some, and therefore the concept never remains within secure boundaries. And in 
any case what would be the point of defining such a concept? - since when, e.g., water and its 
6 Ever since the mathematical/philosophical debate aroused by Hintikka and Parsons’ essays (cf. Posy 
[1992], which contains these as well as other interventions), there have been identified a number of 
conditions a representation must meet to amount to an intuition. I will only mention two of them (cf. 
KrV A19/B33), bearing in mind that they are objects of a heated dispute within the theoretical debate: 
(a) the singularity condition, a criterion based on the type of denotation involved, whereby intuition is 
a singular representation denoting an individual object as opposed to concepts denoting different ob-
jects that fall under it, owing to the presence of the very property the concepts represent; (b) the im-
mediacy condition, which concerns the type of relationship —obviously immediate— a particular rep-
resentation shares with its denotation as opposed to concepts referring to an object in a mediated way 
through those conceptual features (or marks) that compose the very concept’s intension. For the prob-
lems regarding the role of the intuition as an indexical representation, cf. Forgione (2015).
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properties are under discussion, one will not stop at what is intended by the word “water” but 
rather advance to experiments, and the word, with the few marks that are attached to it, is to con-
stitute only a designation and not a concept of the thing; thus the putative definition is nothing 
other than the determination of the word. (KrV A728/B756)
This passage offers several key issues concerning the topics that are being touched on and 
should be contextualized within the distinction between the notion of definition, typical 
of mathematical concepts, and that of exposition, belonging indeed to the sphere of empiri-
cal concepts (cf. Capozzi 1980). If we analyse the material dimension of concepts, the use 
of the terms associated with them, and the experimental scientific research on the making 
of the substances that are the very terms’ referents, from a transcendental point of view it is 
not possible to establish the conceptual characteristics that define once and for all the con-
tents of a term and, along with them, the properties that make up the essence of a natural 
substance. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to establish a definition of the concept, thus 
we can only proceed with an exposition or description —provisional for its own nature— 
of the notes composing it. The definition is an exclusive privilege of the a priori synthesis of 
mathematical concepts: as this is arbitrary, coming about in pure intuition without the ma-
terial intervention of an object, it coincides with the construction, i.e. with the a priori rep-
resentation of an object in intuition that contains nothing but the elements that compose 
the concept itself in a complete and precise Darstellung of the concept in intuition.
6. The semantic reflection in the logical corpus
Although the issue is somewhat more articulated in the logical corpus, it reaches the same 
conclusion. Kant (Logik 1992, 630) states that the doctrine of method, understood as the 
second part of the logic that follows the doctrine of the elements, analyses the form of sci-
ence in general —that is the way to connect the manifold of knowledge to make it a sci-
ence— and expounds how we reach the perfection of knowledge. One of the essential logi-
cal perfections of knowledge is articulated in the distinctness, thoroughness, and systematic 
ordering required by science; in its turn, the distinction of concepts regarding what is con-
tained within and below them is part of the distinction of knowledge. In this context, we 
find the notions of exposition and definition —where the latter is meant as an exact and 
distinct enough concept— mainly analysed in Wiener Logik. In order to frame these con-
cepts it is necessary to follow Kant in his articulation of the different types of concepts.
The first distinction regards (I) conceptus dati and (II) conceptus factitii: while the 
former do not depend on any choice whatsoever, the latter are produced on a voluntary 
basis. Conceptus dati can be: (I.1) a priori, if the concept is given in the intellect, e.g. the 
concept of cause; (I.2) a posteriori, if the concept is given through experience, e.g. the con-
cept of water. In their turn, conceptus factitii, can be (II.1) a priori, if the concept is formed 
through reflection, without the intervention of any element of experience, e.g. the conceptus 
fictitius that supports the representation of a thousand-sided figure; (II.2) a posteriori, if the 
concept is formed on the basis of an object given in experience, e.g. if we wish to form a dis-
tinct concept of a piece of metal we must carry out a series of experiments or tests to record 
all the properties that might emerge from experience so as to extend the concept through 
the addition of subsequent notes.
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At first glance, all conceptus dati (I) —be they a priori (I.1) or a posteriori (I.2)— can 
only be defined through the analysis: ‘For because [the concept] is given, I cannot make 
it distinct except by making clear the marks that lie in it, and that is just analysis’ (Wiener 
Logik 1992, 357). On the other hand, conceptus factitii —be they a priori (II.1) or a poste-
riori (II.2)— can only receive a per synthesin definition (Wiener Logik 1992, 357).
The synthetic definitions of concepts given a posteriori cannot be determined as there 
is no knowledge of every possible and undefined conceptual mark experience can offer. On 
the whole, the analytic definitions of concepts given a posteriori are themselves incomplete: 
‘When the inquirer into nature defines water, e.g., as a fluid body without taste or colour, 
one readily sees how precarious the definition is. He who is not already acquainted with 
water will not thereby become acquainted with it’. It follows that ‘The definition […] is 
completely unsuitable for acquainting others with water. For in the concept water there lies 
so little that I immediately go outside the concept and have to collect new marks through 
experience’ (Wiener Logik 1992, 360). Furthermore, even the analytic definitions of con-
cepts given a priori present several limitations since it is not easy to expound a concept’s 
marks in a precise way.
In this context, it is necessary to introduce the distinction between nominal and real 
definition. As already mentioned, while the former corresponds to the meaning associated 
with a given name to designate logical essence, the latter concerns the knowledge of the ob-
ject according to its internal determinations and corresponds to the foundation of possibil-
ity of the thing (Capozzi 1980, 426-29). In particular, the real definitions are given for the 
conceptus factitii only, e.g., the arbitrary mathematical concepts, concepts of reason and ar-
bitrary inventions. Apart from being real, they are always complete but never wrong7.
Now Kant addresses the possibility to employ the notion of ‘definition’ for empirical 
concepts. In primis, the corresponding object cannot be defined by a real definition; hence, 
we can only resort to the concept through which the object is thought along with the cor-
responding marks involved in the nominal definition. Nonetheless, while these marks are 
always variable, they can never make up the complete concept of an object; once again, by 
using an argument similar to those also already introduced in the KrV, Kant says that in 
naming and defining empirical concepts, ‘we do not all have the same opinions’. As each 
speaker may have different experiences of the same thing, we can only acquire a provisional 
description of empirical concepts relative to particular purposes.
Therefore, in the logical corpus Kant also argues that a real definition —here synthetic 
and real— is possible, coinciding with the accomplished perfection of knowledge only as 
far as conceptus factitii are concerned, in particular for arbitrary concepts paradigmatically 
7 In Logik Blomberg, which is based on lectures given early in the 1770S and then before the introduc-
tion of the distinction between transcendental and general logic, Kant argues: ‘it lies solely with me to 
make up the concept and to establish it as it pleases me, and the whole concept has thus no other re-
ality than merely what my fabrication wants[;] consequently I can always put all the parts that I name 
into a thing[,] and these must then constitute the complete, possible concept of the thing, for the 
whole thing is actual only by means of my will’ (Logik Blomberg 1992, 216). It is exactly because con-
cepts or artefacts are arbitrary that we can choose how to call them through an act of baptism: ‘since 
[…] I will that this shall be called thus, it is called thus’ and this is the reason why ‘the names of things 
that arise in art are also always true[;] their inventor is always right, for they are arbitrary concepts’ 
(Logik Blomberg 1992, 216).
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exemplified by mathematical concepts. Instead, since the synthesis of empirical concepts is 
endless, it is always possible to find new notes in experience that modify the concept. For 
this reason, it is only with mathematical arbitrary concepts that we can associate a defini-
tion that Kant (Logik 1992, 633) also terms declarations, ‘insofar as through them one de-
clares his thoughts or gives account of what one understands by a word. This is the case 
among mathematicians’.
This does not mean that in a logical context a logical/semantic reflection cannot serve 
the specific purpose of anchoring the use of language to a reliable semantic side (at least in a 
provisional way) thanks to the concept’s nominal definition and the corresponding logical 
essence governing the relationship between word and concept. Kant states this principle in 
several passages: ‘By mere definitions of names, or nominal definitions, are to be understood 
those that contain the meaning that one wanted arbitrarily to give to a certain name, and 
which therefore signify only the logical essence of their object, or which serve merely for 
distinguishing it from other objects’ (Logik 1992, 634); ‘It (Nominal definition) means al-
most nothing more than what the expression nominal definition says, a certain attestation 
to the name of the thing, in order to make the name of the thing distinct, but not to have 
better insight into the thing itself’ (Wiener Logik 1992, 361).
In other words, at one extreme, and with respect to the concepts given a priori and a 
posteriori, Kant seems to provide an analytic definition that, in the case of a material or real 
context for a posteriori concepts such as natural kinds, is judged ‘precarious’ since such con-
cepts can be modified at all times. In the case of a logical/formal context, an analytic defi-
nition will be needed in order to capture the logical essence of a concept and fix a stable 
meaning. At the other extreme are the synthetic definitions of conceptus factitii: as with the 
above-mentioned example of the artefacts of the works of art, these can be named by an act 
of baptism without the mediation of a specific conceptual core so that their designation 
may become the connecting core for subsequent synthetic definitions.
7. The role of the designation
This opens a breach in Kant’s conceptualist approach to natural kind terms. In addition to 
the corpus’s considerations, up to this point a number of passages have been quoted: (a) the 
passage from Prolegomena (1997, 267) on the concept of gold’s content as involving an in-
dexical dimension; (b) the passage from the KrV (A721/B749) in which, after explaining 
the content associated with the term gold, it is stated that ‘I can take the matter that goes 
by this name and initiate perceptions of it’; (c) the passage from the KrV (A728/B756), 
whereby we can never be sure that the same number of notes can be thought with the word 
that designates the same object; (d) finally, once again from the passage from the KrV 
(A728/B756), whenever we speak of water and its properties from the point of view of the 
material and its properties, we cannot limit ourselves to what is contained in the thought 
and its concept given a posteriori: ‘when, e.g., water and its properties are under discussion, 
one will not stop at what is intended by the word “water” but rather advance to experi-
ments, and the word, with the few marks that are attached to it, is to constitute only a des-
ignation and not a concept of the thing’.
If in the material dimension of transcendental logic, the word, with the few marks that 
are attached to it, constitutes only a designation and not a concept of the thing, the logi-
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cal essence is no longer the centre of mediation between substance and term. At the same 
time, as has been said, the synthetic definitions of concepts given a posteriori cannot be de-
termined because new observations can modify the conceptual content associated with the 
term8; thus, we will not be able to learn all possible marks provided by experience. In Logik 
Dohna-Wundlacken Kant (1992, 464) also points out that of a natural substance such as 
water, ‘We can never have complete insight into the real essence, e.g., we can never experi-
ence all the marks of water no matter how far physics advances’. It is for this precise reason 
that, in a material dimension, the designation (Bezeichnung) —i.e. the link between term 
and substance, albeit accompanied by the notes the term carries along with it— becomes 
the fulcrum of the semantic device of natural kind terms. Since it is synthetic judgements 
that come into play in this dimension, we need to exit from the logical/formal dimension 
and move to the indexical mechanism of the empirical intuition, which will eventually turn 
into the bridge linking word-concept and substance, the hook that enables us to speak of 
the same substance even if the same notes that make up the related concept are not shared.
Undoubtedly these considerations link Kant to the spirit of the direct reference theory 
or, at the very least, they controvert a pure conceptualist approach a là Locke. At the same 
time, it does not seem possible to assert a direct relationship between terms and substances 
along the lines of Putnam’s indexical component through the attribution of a twofold com-
ponent (both demonstrative and descriptive) to natural kind concepts9. This is due to the 
presence in the designation, even so specified, of certain notes that constantly accompany the 
word-concept in the first place. More importantly, a natural kind concept is no special empir-
ical concept containing a demonstration component: like any other empirical concept, it may 
have a singular use10 and be employed in indexical cognitive performances as involve empirical 
intuition within the form of a singular judgement. Kant’s examples, among which the already 
quoted passage from Prolegomena, should be contextualized in this bigger picture.
In a nutshell, even when Kant in the KrV (A728/B756) focuses on the Bezeichnung 
—the word that designate the thing, rather than its concept— this will involve some of the 
notes that accompany the word and the intuition serving as the substance’s designative ter-
minal. The demonstrative component is irrelevant to the concept and, in a material dimen-
8 Logik Blomberg (1992, 87): ‘gold differs from all other metals through its weight, but a metal has also 
been discovered, named platina, that is white in colour but has the same weight as gold. Consequently 
this mark, this distinguishing ground of gold from all remaining metals, is not sufficient enough’. Cf. 
Capozzi (2002, 497). 
9 Hanna (2006, 212-13): ‘Kant regards natural kind concepts as a special case of his theory of empirical 
concepts. He explicitly describes “my concept of gold, which had as its content that this body is y ellow 
and metal”; hence gold partially decomposes to this conceptual microstructure: <this body + yel-
low + metal>. It can be immediately seen that for Kant gold contains two distinct components: (a) a 
referential component, this body; and (b) an attributive or descriptive component that reflects some 
(but obviously, not all) of the manifest identifying properties of gold, namely, yellow and metal. What 
I want to argue is that for Kant this fusion of distinct components yields the very feature of natural 
kind concepts that sets them radically apart from all other sorts of empirical concepts’. Kroon and 
Nola (1987) have already argued that Kant implicitly —as well as inconsistently— identifies two dif-
ferent natural kind concepts, a rigidly designating concept and a concept-stereotype.
10 Kant (Logik 1992, 589) explicitly states that there is no singular concept whatsoever: by definition, 
concepts are representations whose logical form is always general. However, he also admits the possi-
bility of three different uses of concepts: one general, one singular, and one particular.
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sion —both in the formation of an empirical concept and in its application— it only in-
volves the intuition in an act of judgement that, in the applied case, tries to bring it under 
the brim of the abstract concept through the schematic process of imagination.
Probably it is starting with a semantic reflection on proper names that the tension be-
tween a conceptualist approach and one based on a direct semantic device becomes tangible 
to the extent that, in certain passages, Kant seems to be giving more importance to the lat-
ter than the former. Following Capozzi’s (2009, 2015) contributions, proper names are as-
sociated with conceptus singulares, ‘as disconcerting may be the presence of this term in the 
Kantian logical lexicon’ since Kant explicitly rejects the existence of singular concepts: ‘be-
ing something’ and ‘being one’ constitute the only necessary notes articulating its contents. 
This minimalist/conceptualist approach to the semantics of proper names allows consid-
erations that seem to parallel the theory of direct reference, if we consider the problem of 
epistemic identification and its relative application to proper names, and the fact that sin-
gular concepts designated by proper names cannot differ in content —which is the same 
for everyone— but only in number: ‘differentia numerica (Caius, Titius)’ (Reflexion, 2901, 
16.566). In Logik Dohna-Wundlacken (1992, 489), numerical difference is made explicit 
as ‘the distinction of the conceptus singulares, insofar as they are not common to several. 
Among men we indicate them by nomina propria’. Accordingly, it is the names themselves 
—and their own bearers’ designations— rather than the mediation of conceptus singulares 
that determine the differences among individuals. Once again, in the example of Logik 
Dohna-Wundlacken (1992, 496), if two learned men are not distinguishable through the 
conceptual notes attributed to the singular concepts representing them, it must be the nu-
merical difference that makes a difference; this will be signified by the relative designation 
of proper names or their initials: ‘Learned men are specifically the same and generically, 
too, and nonetheless numerically different[,] as C. and J.’.
8. Conclusions
In conclusion, for the presence of certain notes in the designation that constantly accom-
pany the natural kind terms (and also the proper names) Kant does not introduce a direct 
referential mechanism and appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist po-
sition spelled out according to the principles of transcendental idealism, although he seems 
to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference. Thanks to the des-
ignation of a substance, we can speak of the same substance even if two speakers have dif-
ferent knowledge of it and even if they do not share exactly the same conceptual notes, or 
when science brings about new knowledge and further observations change the concept as-
sociated with the substance term. As has been said with respect to the difference between 
definition and exposition, ‘an empirical concept cannot be defined at all but only expli-
cated. For since we have in it only some marks of a certain kind of objects of the senses, it 
is never certain whether by means of the word that designates the same object one does not 
sometimes think more of these marks but another time fewer of them’ (KrV A 728/B756).
The fragment in question vaguely recalls what Putnam termed ‘the division of lin-
guistic labour’ within a community on the assumption that speakers cannot all share the 
knowledge of a particular natural kind in the same way. On this issue, however, the true 
precursor of Putnam’s positions is Leibniz; save for the metaphysical instance, whereby 
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there exists an order of truth that is independent from our way of knowing, Leibniz reveals 
men the entire world of history, the contingent character of the formation of knowledge 
and linguistic definitions. At the same time, precisely because the broad spectrum of in-
détermination du langage opens within the historical order, it is a mistake to judge what is 
conceived with a certain name to be exactly what other more expert people conceive. One 
won’t err ‘if we have recourse to the experts when fine points arise about whatever it is that 
the name is generally understood to stand for’ (1765, III, VI, 30, 323).
In Putnam (1975, 227-8), as in Leibniz, the result is surprisingly similar: within a given 
community, there exists in the broad sense a division of labour on which is based the divi-
sion of linguistic labour (noticeably, some commentators, among which Leibniz himself, 
regard the distinction of these two aspects as futile, cf. Marconi 1997).
The following Leibniz-Theophilus’s ideas in response to Locke-Philalethes’s —the 
former being an argument against Locke-Philalethes’s claim that languages have arisen 
before science, and the latter advocating for the need to study the natural history of sub-
stances— both anticipate Putnam’s position on this ground, i.e. the priority of the scien-
tific knowledge of natural essences that experts develop over that of common people: ‘the 
people who study a subject-matter correct popular notions. Assayers have found precise 
methods for identifying and separating metals, botanists have marvelously extended our 
knowledge of plants’ (Leibniz 1765, III, VI, 25, 318). In addition, the phenomenon of ‘se-
mantic deference’, a central aspect in the perspective and social character of the division of 
linguistic labour, is also reasserted:
the name ‘gold’, for instance, signifies not merely what the speaker knows about gold, e.g. some-
thing yellow and very heavy, but also what he does not know, which may be know about gold by 
someone else, namely: a body endowed with an inner constitution from which flow its colour and 
weight, and which also generates other properties which he acknowledges to be better known by 
those who are experts. (Leibniz, 1765, III, XI, 24, 354)
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